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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the Internet-related phenomena of the early twenty-first
century has been the exponential rise in the number of Web logs (referred
to generally and hereinafter as "blogs"). Millions of people have begun
chronicling their lives through online diaries and social networks.
Sometimes they disclose too much information: describing past drug use,
allowing pictures of themselves drunk at parties to be displayed, and
griping about work. More and more of these "bloggers" are being fired
because of what they publish online.
This article reviews current employment law in light of the rising
popularity of blogs.1 In particular, the application of the employment-at-
will doctrine and its evolving exceptions is examined in the context of
employees who blog. While individuals may believe that they have the
right to say what they want to on their own time while using their own
resources, the employment-at-will doctrine remains a powerful tool for
employers to discharge their employees without legal backlash. However,
the employment-at-will doctrine is not an absolute shield for employers and
this article discusses those few circumstances in which an employer faces
some potential liability.
* J.D., M.B.A., Assistant Professor, Department of Management and Marketing, University
of Wyoming College of Business. The author wishes to thank Michael Thatcher, J.D., 2006,
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1. This article addresses employment laws related to private employers; it does not
address the gamut of laws which may apply to public employers. In addition, this article
addresses activities by employees (including former employees), not employment
applicants. This article does not address the growing phenomenon of individuals publishing
potentially embarrassing information on the Internet which is later accessed by potential
employers. For a discussion of the latter phenomenon, see Michelle Conlin, You Are What
You Post, Bus. WK., Mar. 27, 2006, at 52 (explaining that employers may use Google for
background checks).
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II. THE GROWTH AND CONSEQUENCES OF EMPLOYEES WHO BLOG
The number of blogs is in the tens of millions, with tens of thousands
of new blogs started every day. 2 These Internet-based "diaries" involve a
wide range of subjects, including politics, technology-related issues, any
imaginable hobbies, as well as recitations of personal thoughts and
experiences, and work-related subjects.'
While originally blogs were used by the technically savvy, blogs
are now being used by the masses as a type of electronic diary
where people can post their thoughts on everything from politics
and life in general, to comments (sometimes unfavorable) about
your ... business. The difference between a blog and a diary,
however, is that anyone with access to the Internet can read,
copy, e-mail or print the blog entries.4
It is estimated that as much as five percent of American workers
maintain a personal blog.5 As individuals have blogged about their favorite
new musical group or their favorite television show, they occasionally do
what most of us have done at one time or another-griped about their boss,
2. See Memorandum from Lee Rainie, Director, The Pew Internet & American Life
Project (Jan. 2, 2005), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP-blogging-data.pdf
(estimating the existence of more than eight million blogs at the end of 2004); Posting of
Dave Sifry to Technorati Weblog, http://www.technorati.com/weblog/2006/02/81.html
(Feb. 6, 2006) (showing that Technorati, a blog tracking service, reported in early 2006 that
it was tracking 27.2 million blogs, with nearly 75,000 new blogs being tracked every day).
3. See Scott Rosenberg, Fear of Links, SALON.COM (May 28, 1999),
http://www.salon.com/tech/col/rose/1999/05/28/weblogs (describing blogs as "personal
Web sites operated by individuals who compile chronological lists of links to stuff [on the
Internet] that interests them, interspersed with information, editorializing and personal
asides"). It appears attorneys are one of the categories of professionals that most frequently
use blogs. See Cameron Stracher, After (Billable) Hours, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2006, at
W19 (referring to a survey indicating that "lawyers ranked fourth among both readers and
posters to blogs"). Personal blogs are very easy to establish, with services that allow
individuals to start a blog in a matter of minutes. See, e.g., Blogger,
http://www.blogger.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (providing an easy way for people to
create a blog for free); Technocrati, http://www.technorati.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2006)
(illustrating the number and types of different blogs by displaying an index of blogs as well
as providing a search function for them). The world of blogs (known as the "blogosphere")
contains its own vernacular: blog authors are referred to as "bloggers" and information
published on a blog is "posted" as a "message." See, e.g., Blog - Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (providing an
introduction to web logs and the jargon used in the associated community). The activity of
posting messages on a blog is referred to as "blogging." Id.
4. Jeffrey M. Schlossberg & Kimberly B. Malerba, Outside Counsel: Employer
Regulation of Blogging, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 4.
5. See Amy Joyce, Blogged Out of a Job, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at F06 ("[The
Employment Law Alliance] conducted a telephone poll of 1,000 [sic] adults ... that found
about 5 percent of American workers maintain a personal blog.").
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talked about what a lousy job they have, or even bragged about what they
do at work. For a growing number of these bloggers, this has resulted in
their being fired. Consider the following examples which have received
public exposure:
*Heather Armstrong, a Web designer, was fired after posting
comments about her workplace on her personal blog, including her
comments regarding the office Christmas party;
6
-A Delta Airlines flight attendant was fired after publishing pictures
of herself (in relatively risqu6 poses) in her uniform aboard a Delta plane;7
*Mark Jen started his own blog soon after starting work for Google,
and a few weeks later was fired by Google after he posted his impressions
of a Google sales meeting;8
-Joyce Park, a Web developer for Friendster, a company "known for
breaking new ground in online social networking and promoting self-
expression among peers," was fired as a result of her postings on her blog,
Troutgirl; 9
*Rachel Mosteller was fired by the Durham Herald-Sun of North
Carolina one day after she posted comments on her blog critical of her
employer (including the statement "I really hate my place of
employment.") even though Mosteller used a pseudonym, did not name her
company or where it was based, and did not name her co-workers;' °
6. Blog-Linked Firings Prompt Calls for Better Policies,
http://web.archive.org/web/20050306212034/http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/03/0
6/firedforblogging.ap/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). In regard to personal blogs, the
president of the National Workrights Institute commented, "Because it's less formal, you're
more likely to say something that would offend your boss." Id. Heather Armstrong was one
of the first reported employees fired after venting about her company on her personal blog,
dooce.com. Id. Within the blogosphere, "dooced" refers to being fired for blogging. Id.
See also Stephanie Armour, Warning: Your Clever Little Blog Could Get You Fired, USA
TODAY, Jun. 15, 2005, at 1B, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-06-14-worker-blogs-usatx.htm (listing
examples of what was posted on Armstrong's blog); cf Dooce: This Is Going to Be a Long
One, so Don't Say I Didn't Warn You (May 19, 2003),
http://www.dooce.com/archives/daily/05-19 2003.html (detailing Armstrong's interactions
with newspaper reporters as well as other ways that her web site has affected her life).
7. Ellen Simonetti, I Was Fired for Blogging, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 6, 2004,
http://news.com.com/l+was+fired+for+blogging/2010-1030_3-5490836.html.
8. John Foley, The Weblog Question, INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 31, 2005, at 39,
available at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=59100462.
9. Stefanie Olsen, Friendster Fires Developer for Blog, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 31,
2004, http://news.com.com/Friendster+fires+developer+for+blog/2100-1038_3-
5331835.html (noting that Park stated, "I only made three posts about Friendster on my blog
before they decided to fire me, and it was all publicly available information. They did not
have any policy, didn't give me any warning, they didn't ask me to take anything down.").
10. Amy Joyce, Free Expression Can Be Costly When Bloggers Bad-Mouth Jobs,
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at AO1.
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-Nadine Haobsh, an associate beauty editor at Ladies' Home Journal,
who was about to resign and take a job at Seventeen, was asked to leave
Ladies' Home Journal and had her Seventeen job offer rescinded after the
magazines discovered she was blogging about work;"
*A contractor working for Microsoft lost his job after he took pictures
of Apple G5 computers being delivered to the Microsoft campus and
posted the pictures on his blog;'
2
-Wells Fargo dismissed an employee after managers learned of the
employee's blog, which made fun of some of his co-workers;"' 3
*A reporter at the Houston Chronicle was fired as a result of postings
on his personal blog;
14
*A professor at DeVry University was dismissed after criticizing the
school on her blog;'5 and
-The Automobile Club of Southern California fired twenty-seven
employees after another employee complained about messages posted by
the workers on the online social network MySpace.com. 16
The immediate reaction to these anecdotes is to ask whether an
employer can legally discharge an employee simply because the employee
was publishing a "diary" on the Internet. 7 Many employees would
probably be surprised to learn that simple "water cooler" griping about
work could lead to their legally being fired. 8 Just as an employer may
wish to terminate an employee when it "perceives the content of employee
e-mail as disloyal, distracting, or counterproductive to the employer's
mission," so too may an employer wish to terminate an employee who is
11. Jeremy Blachman, Job Posting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A19.
12. Evan Hansen, Google Blogger Has Left the Building, CNET NEWS.cOM, Feb. 9,
2005, http://news.com.com/Google+blogger+has+left+the+building/2100-1038_3-
5567863.html.
13. Armour, supra note 6.
14. Kathryn S. Wenner, Scribe's Secret, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Sep. 2002, at 9.
15. Jennifer Brown, Prof's Firing Stirs Blog Debate, DENVER POST, Jan. 8, 2006, at C-
ol.
16. Auto Club Fires 27 in Message Board Crackdown, USA TODAY.coM, Aug. 6,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-08-06-posters-fired_x.htm (describing
auto-club's firing of workers for posting messages on a social networking site).
17. Discharge represents the most extreme of disciplines. As the blogging phenomenon
grows, so does the potential for employee discipline. See Joyce, supra note 5 (showing that
three percent of 278 human resource professionals responding to a 2005 Society for Human
Resource Management survey indicated they had disciplined employees for blogs).
18. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why
Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 7, 9 (2002) (discussing studies that indicate most
employees believe that they can only be fired for "just cause"); cf Joyce, supra note 5
(describing a poll by the Employment Law Alliance which found that "[twenty-three]
percent of employees would support a fellow worker who criticizes or jokes about
employers, co-workers, supervisors, customers or clients").
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publicly commenting about work,'9 since "the employer may perceive it to
be in the best interest of the business to cut loose such negative actors."2
The employment-at-will doctrine permits an employer to terminate an
employee at any time, with or without cause. This does not mean,
however, that employers have blanket immunity from liability. While the
employment-at-will doctrine is fairly straightforward, exceptions to the
doctrine have been evolving in the past few decades, both at common law
and through state legislation. This Article examines the employment-at-
will doctrine and its evolving exceptions and provides an analysis of
whether there may be potential liability for an employer that fires an
employee based on the content of that employee's personal blog.
III. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL, ITS EVOLVING EXCEPTIONS, AND
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
As a general matter, the relationship between an employer and an
employee is contractual. Where there is a contract, an employer's ability to
legally terminate an employment relationship with an employee will be
dependent upon the terms of the employment agreement between the
employer and the employee. In most employment relationships, however,
there is no express agreement as to the length of employment or the terms
under which the employment may continue or may be terminated.2 In
such situations, the employment-at-will doctrine controls.
The employment-at-will doctrine provides that, for an employment
relationship of an indefinite term, both the employer and the employee may
terminate the relationship at any time, with or without cause, as long as the
termination does not violate a contract or employment-related statute.22
19. See Christine Neylon O'Brien, The Impact of Employer E-Mail Policies on
Employee Rights to Engage in Concerted Activities Protected by the National Labor
Relations Act, 106 DICK. L. REV. 573, 574-75 (2002) (describing legal restrictions and
incentives for regulating e-mail content).
20. Id. at 575.
21. See Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 850 (1994) (citing statistics indicating
that two-thirds of private-sector employees are subject to the employment-at-will doctrine,
i.e., are "at-will" employees).
22. Edwin Robert Cottone, Employee Protection from Unjust Discharge: A Proposal
for Judicial Reversal of the Terminable-at- Will Doctrine, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1259,
1259 (2002); see David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful
Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33. AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 646
(1996) ("(I]n the absence of an employment contract of specified term, the employment
relationship is terminable at any time by either party and for any reason not specifically
proscribed by statute."); see also Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 (Cal. 2000)
("An at-will employment may be ended by either party 'at any time without cause,' for any
or no reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory requirement of notice."
(quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988))); Lobosco v. N.Y.
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The employment-at-will doctrine is generally considered to have emerged
from judicial opinions in the period after the Civil War, and "was widely
followed throughout the late-nineteenth century and the first part of the
,,23 TeUStwentieth century. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the employers'
basic right to discharge employees in Adair v. United States early in the
24twentieth century. All states and the District of Columbia, except
Montana, have adopted the employment-at-will doctrine. Montana has, by
statute, limited employers' ability to discharge employees and preempted
common law employment-at-will actions. 25  Three other states-Arizona,
California, and Georgia-have codified the employment-at-will doctrine.26
Tel. Co./NYNEX, 751 N.E.2d 462, 464 (N.Y. 2001) ("Where the term of employment is for
an indefinite period of time, it is presumed to be a hiring at will that may be freely
terminated by either party at any time for any reason or even for no reason.").
23. Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at- Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37
AM. Bus. L.J. 653, 654 (2000). Ballam discusses one of the earliest employment-at-will
cases, Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled by Hutton v.
Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915), showing that employers "may dismiss their employes
[sic] at will, be they many or few, for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Id. at 653 n.4 (quoting Payne, 81
Tenn. at 519-20).
24. 208 U.S. 161, 166-69, 172, 180 (1908) (striking down as unconstitutional a federal
statute's section prohibiting carriers engaged in interstate commerce from discharging
employees who become members of a labor organization), overruled by Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 186-87 (1941) (finding that the federal statute under review left an
employer "as free to hire as he is to discharge employees" and did "not touch 'the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them."' (quoting
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1936))).
In our opinion that section ... is an invasion of the personal liberty, as well as
of the right of property, guaranteed by... [the Fifth] Amendment. Such liberty
and right embraces the right to make contracts for the purchase of the labor of
others and equally the right to make contracts for the sale of one's own labor;
each right, however, being subject to the fundamental condition that no contract,
whatever its subject matter, can be sustained which the law, upon reasonable
grounds, forbids as inconsistent with the public interests or as hurtful to the
public order or as detrimental to the common good.
Adair, 208 U.S. at 172.
25. Montana adopts the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine,
discussed infra notes 110-149 and accompanying text. The state also requires a showing of
"good cause" for the majority of employment discharges. See MONT. CODE ANN § 39-2-
904(1) (2005) (declaring discharge to be wrongful only if done in retaliation for employees
refusal to violate or to report a violation of public policy; there was no "good cause" for
discharging the employee; or if the employer fired an employee in violation of its own
written policies). Montana's statute preempts common claims for wrongful discharge.
MONT. CODE ANN § 39-2-9013 (2005).
26. Arizona has codified the employment at will doctrine in ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
23-1501.2 (2006):
The employment relationship is severable at the pleasure of either the employee
or the employer unless both the employee and the employer have signed a
written contract to the contrary setting forth that the employment relationship
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Taken to its extreme, the employment-at-will doctrine means that
employers can dismiss employees for arbitrary or irrational reasons:
"because of office politics, nepotism, preference for left-handedness,
astrological sign, or their choice of favorite sports team.' 2 7  Over time,
however, courts have fashioned limits to the application of the
employment-at-will doctrine. The most common exceptions are based on
implied contract 8 and public policy, with public policy being the
justification behind recent statutory expansions in common law.29 In
addition, some courts have recognized exceptions based on promissory
estoppel," the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,3 1 intentional
infliction of emotional distress,32 and privacy.33 Each of these exceptions is
discussed below.
First, though, potential employer liabilities related to conduct outside
the employment-at-will doctrine-i.e. termination in violation of
employment-related statutes and termination in violation of an express
contract-are discussed. Overall, employer liability for wrongful
employee discharge may occur if the employee was terminated in violation
of a contract, an applicable employment-related statutory provision, or an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.34
shall remain in effect for a specified duration of time or otherwise expressly
restricting the right of either party to terminate the employment relationship.
California's statute provides, in part, that "[a]n employment, having no specified term, may
be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other." CAL. LABOR CODE § 2922
(West 2003). Georgia's Term of Employment statute provides, in part, that "[a]n indefinite
hiring may be terminated at will by either party." GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (2005).
There has been an ongoing effort to codify the employment-at-will doctrine in a
uniform act through the Model Employment Termination Act, produced by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. To date, no state has adopted the
model act. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-summaries/uniformacts-s-meta.asp (last visited
Oct. 23, 2006)(advocating adoption of Model Employment Termination Act). See also
Sprang, supra note 21, at 891-909 (analyzing the Model Employment Termination Act).
27. Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 517, 551 (2004). But see Agis v. Howard Johnson Company for an example of
behavior that was so outrageous the employer was liable for the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress, though not wrongful discharge. 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976). In
Agis, the employer began firing employees in alphabetical order during an investigation of
employee theft. Bird, supra, at 554.
28. See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 110-149 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 104-109 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 150-171 and accompanying text.
34. See Bird, supra note 27, at 519 ("Wrongful discharge is a term that defines various
conditions under which an employee may challenge her dismissal even though the
employment relationship is governed by employment at will."). See also Ballam, supra note
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A. Termination in Violation ofApplicable Employment-Related Statutory
Provisions
An employer can be civilly liable for wrongful discharge if an
employee is dismissed in violation of an applicable employment-related
statutory provision. The most obvious example of this type of wrongful
discharge is when an employee is discharged (or forced to resign) in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"5 as well as any of its
applicable state-law equivalents. Additional federal employment-related
statutes include the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),36 the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),37 the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act),38 and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).3 9
Although an employee could be discharged ostensibly because of her
off-duty blogging, an employer may be held liable for violating an
employment-related statute applicable to circumstances surrounding the
discharge. For example, if the discharged blogger can establish she was
treated differently because of her membership in a protected class (e.g.,
gender), the employer could potentially face a discrimination claim.
This scenario occurred at Delta Air Lines. Ellen Simonetti, a Delta
employee, was fired shortly after she posted pictures of herself in her Delta
uniform on a Delta plane on her personal blog:
http://www.queenofsky.net.40  Initially, Simonetti was suspended after the
pictures were posted. During her own investigation, Simonetti determined
that male Delta employees had posted pictures of themselves in Delta
uniforms on Web sites and blogs, and had not been disciplined. Thereafter,
Simonetti filed a gender-based discrimination complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Three weeks later, Delta fired
Simonetti, and she filed suit in federal court alleging discrimination.4'
23, at 654 (describing the development of the tort of wrongful discharge). But see Sprang,
supra note 21, at 851 (defining wrongful discharge as a "termination [that] is not justified by
some nondiscriminatory business reason that would meet the standard of 'just cause' or
'good cause."') (footnote omitted).
35. 42 U.S.C. § § 2000a-2000e-15 (2006).
36. 29 U.S.C. § § 621-33a (2006).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2006).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
40. Simonetti, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
41. Complaint at *1, Ellen Simonetti v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2005 WL 2897844 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 7, 2005) (No. 05-2321). Simonetti also alleged that her dismissal was in
retaliation for her union activities. Id. at *5. As of the date of this article, Simonetti's
complaint has been dismissed without prejudice due to Delta's bankruptcy filing. Simonetti
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 05-2321 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 28, 2005) (administratively terminating
this action, without prejudice to the right of any party to reopen the proceedings within 30
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1. Private Blogs
Although, as discussed below, 42 the typical blogger will most likely
not be able to claim invasion of privacy for the simple reason that most
blogs are open and available to anyone with Internet access, some may
rationally make said claim because not all blogs are public. Some blogs are
configured so that only those who have been granted specific access are
allowed to read the blog. Employers may face liability if they improperly
access these private blogs. An employer may also face liability for
violation of the federal Stored Communications Act ("SCA") 43 for
improperly accessing a private blog. In general, the SCA provides privacy
protection for communications stored by Internet Web sites. The act
prohibits unauthorized access to stored communications.44 The act exempts
from liability, though, access authorized by a Web site user.45
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. demonstrates an application of the
SCA where an employer faces potential liability for accessing an
employee's private blog.46  The plaintiff, a pilot employed by the
defendant, maintained a Web site that contained critical commentary about
the defendant's management practices. Konop's Web site required users to
have an assigned usemame and password in order to access the site, and
Konop maintained a list of authorized users, which consisted primarily of
other Hawaiian Airline employees. In addition, users who were allowed
access to the website were required to accept the site's terms and
conditions of use, which included the prohibition of "any member of
Hawaiian's management from viewing the website [sic] and prohibited
users from disclosing the website's [sic] contents to anyone else., 47  A
Hawaiian Airlines senior manager (a vice president who did not have
authorized access to the Web site) used other pilots' usernames and
passwords (with their permission) to access the Web site.
days of the issuance of an order by the bankruptcy court lifting the stay).
42. See infra notes 150-171 and accompanying text.
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000 & Supp. I 2001). See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide
to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1208 (2004) ("The SCA was enacted in 1986 as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act.").
44. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1193 (2003) (noting that "[tihe SCA makes it an offense to 'intentionally
access[ ] without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service
is provided ... and thereby obtain[ ] ... access to a wire or electronic communication while
it is in electronic storage in such system."' (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1))).
45. See id. (stating that the SCA exempts "conduct authorized ... by a user of that
service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user." (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
2701(c)(2))).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 872-73.
2007]
364 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:2
The Ninth Circuit and the parties agreed that the SCA applied to
Konop's Web site. In the case, the critical issue was whether the vice
president's access to the Web site was unauthorized. Section 2701(c)(2) of
the SCA "allows a person to authorize a third party's access to an
electronic communication if the person is 1) a 'user' of the 'service' and 2)
the communication is 'of or intended for that user.,' 48  There was no
question that the pilots who allowed the vice president to access the Web
site were authorized users, and they gave the vice president permission to
use their usernames and passwords to access the Web site. At this point,
therefore, it would seem as if the vice president did not violate the SCA
when he accessed Konop's Web site. As such, an employer may believe it
too would not be liable (at least under the SCA) if it used a pre-authorized
user's account to access an employee's private blog.
However, the Ninth Circuit found the Hawaiian Airlines' vice
president was guilty of violating the SCA. There was no record of the
pilots whose accounts were used ever accessing the Web site (even though
they were authorized to do so). As such, they were not actual "users"
within the plain language of the statute.49 As a result, the vice president's
access was not exempt from the act. To date, Konop appears to be the only
authority on this issue. Therefore, if an employer wishes to use someone
else's authorized access to read an employee's private blog, the employer
must make sure that the "someone else" has actually previously "used" or
accessed the private blog.
B. Concerted Activities
An employer may also run afoul of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") if an employee's blog is devoted to work-related issues rather
than to personal items with the occasional work-related gripe. For
example, an anonymous Microsoft Corporation employee has created a
blog, called "Mini-Microsoft," which contains comments critical of
Microsoft managementf °  The blog also reportedly contains earnest
suggestions for fixing Microsoft, and the blogger has become somewhat of
a folk hero; some believe he is "the employee most likely to save
Microsoft-and the most likely to be fired."'"
48. Id. at 880.
49. Id.
50. Jay Green, A Rendezvous With Microsoft's Deep Throat, Bus. WK., Sept. 26, 2005,
available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_39/b3952009.htm?chan=search.
51. Id. See generally, Mini Microsoft, http://minimsft.blogspot.com/ (Oct. 9, 2006)
(stating the Mini-Microsoft blogger's description of the purpose of the site (found in the
"About" section), specifically: "Let's slim down Microsoft into a lean, mean, efficient
customer pleasing profit making machine! Mini-Microsoft, Mini-Microsoft, lean-and-
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Section 7 of the NLRA52 "guarantees employees the right to engage in
'concerted activities' not only for self-organization but also 'for the
purpose of... mutual aid or protection.... Fundamentally, Section 7
protects workers who are trying to improve their working conditions 4 In
contrast, Section 7 does not protect an employee airing her own individual
complaints about management 5
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7.56 "[A]n employer violates Section
8(a)(1) by discharging an employee for engaging in concerted activities
protected by the Act. 5 7 For example, an employee who was fired after
sending an e-mail message to management complaining about a new
incentive compensation plan, indicating that he was speaking on behalf of
fellow employees, was discharged in violation of the NLRA.
58
The activities of Konop, the Hawaiian Airlines pilot who maintained a
private Web site used to criticize management, were considered protected
activities under the Railway Labor Act (because he was a member of a
union representing carrier employees).5 9 Had he not been a member of a
union, his activities would have clearly fallen within the language of
Section 7 of the NLRA.6 ° Indeed, the Konop court, in discussing one of
Hawaiian Airlines' defenses, turned to the NLRA for guidance in applying
the Railway Labor Act.6 ' In addition, Hawaiian Airlines claimed that
Konop's activities were not protected because he made defamatory
mean!").
52. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
53. Citizens Inv. Servs. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 430 F.3d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In
particular, Section 7 applies to non-unionized workers because since they have no
bargaining representative, they must speak for themselves. Id.
54. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Mount Desert Island Hosp., 695 F.2d 634, 637 (1st Cir. 1982)
("One of the chief rights protected is the right to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of improving working conditions.") (citation omitted).
55. See Nancy J. King, Labor Law for Managers of Non-Union Employees in
Traditional and Cyber Workplaces, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 827, 833 (2003) (discussing why
personal grievances are not given the same protection as concerted activity).
56. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
57. Citizens, 430 F.3d at 1197 (citation omitted).
58. Id. at 1199 (rejecting the Company's defense that the employee was discharged
because he was a "troublemaker" and "not a team player"). See also Timekeeping Systems,
Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244 (1997) (explaining that an e-mail message sent by employee to
fellow employees criticizing new vacation policy was protected concerted activity).
59. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 879 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1193 (2003).
60. Id. at 882.
61. Id. at 882 n.10 ("While employers covered under the [Railway Labor Act] are not
subject to the provisions of the NLRA, courts look to the NLRA and the cases interpreting it
for guidance.") (citation omitted).
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comments directed toward Hawaiian Airlines' management on his
website. 62  As a general proposition-employees can use fairly
inflammatory language in their criticisms of management and still retain
NLRA protection, as long as their statements do not rise to the level of
actual malice. 63 Employees may also lose the protection of Section 7 when
they post an employer's confidential business information on the Internet.6 a
One protection for employee bloggers, though, derives from the fact that
they are presumably blogging off-site, on their own time, and not using
employer resources. The protection for employees to engage in discussions
relating to wages, hours, and working conditions assumes that the
discussions do not violate a legitimate employer policy regarding use of
work time or work equipment.65
Section 7 will not, however, protect an employee who engages in
insubordination. Merely complaining about a supervisor is not protected
because the selection and retention of a supervisor has been traditionally
viewed as a management prerogative, not a matter of concern for
subordinates. 66 Further, criticizing a supervisor in an attempt to have the
supervisor removed or discharged will be considered insubordination that is
not protected by Section 7.67 An open issue is whether an anonymous
employee who calls for the resignation of top management on a public blog
is being insubordinate.68 One distinguishing factor of an employee blog
criticizing management, such as the Mini-Microsoft blog, versus e-mail
messages sent by one employee to a supervisor or fellow employees, is that
the employee blog will most likely be available for reading to the general
public. This, alone, should not defeat Section 7 protection. 69  What is
critical, however, is that any public appeal concern primarily working
62. Konop had allegedly published statements on his Web site to the effect that
management performed "dirty work" like the Nazis in World War II and conducted Soviet-
style negotiations. Id. at 882-83.
63. Id. at 883 ("Federal labor law protects even false and defamatory statements unless
such statements are made'with actual malice .....
64. King, supra note 55, at 854-55.
65. See O'Brien, supra note 19, at 576.
66. King, supra note 55, at 852.
67. Id., citing Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio v. N.L.R.B., 268 F.3d 1095, 1103-05
(2001).
68. In early 2006, when Microsoft announced it was delaying the release of its latest
operating system (Vista), Mini-Microsoft posted an entry entitled: "Vista 2007. Fire the
Leadership Now!" The posting generated over 500 reader comments within one week. See
Mini-Microsoft Blog, Vista 2007. Fire Leadership Now,
http://minimsft.blogspot.com/2006/03/vista-2007-fire-leadership-now.html (last visited Mar.
28, 2006).
69. King, supra note 55, at 851-52. See also N.L.R.B. v. Mount Desert Island Hosp.,
695 F.2d 634, 639-40 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that a letter to a newspaper was a direct
overture for further concerted efforts to improve working conditions).
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conditions and avoid needlessly tarnishing the employer's image.7 °
However, not only is the author of the Mini-Microsoft blog anonymous,
current employees, former employees, and even the general public read and
comment on the blogger's messages. It may therefore be difficult for the
blogger to claim that the purpose of his comments were for the mutual aid
and protection of himself and fellow Microsoft employees.
C. Termination in Compliance With the Terms of an Express Contract
The employment relationship may be governed by an express contract.
In such a case, if the employer complies with the contract's stated reasons
permitting dismissal, and follows the specified dismissal procedures, there
is no wrongful discharge. Dismissals under an express contract are also
closely tied to dismissals for "just" or "good" cause, on the basis that the
discharged employee has failed to meet performance standards.
While the employment-at-will doctrine allows termination of the
employment relationship with or without cause, "just cause" provides an
employer a defense against a wrongful discharge claim. Generally, courts
consider the employer to have met the just cause requirements when the
termination occurs in good faith due to a reduction in workforce, the
employee's failure to meet performance standards, or when the employee
engages in conduct that injures the employer's reputation or interests.
71
Employers may have a substantial interest in the content of blogs
written by employees. First and foremost, employers may be concerned
that employees may either intentionally or unintentionally reveal trade
secrets or critical strategies.72 Commenting on corporate blogs, William
70. See id. at 640.
71. Bird, supra note 27, at 531-32. See id. at 533 ("Employers only need to articulate a
good faith belief that a just cause to terminate exists."); Parrish v. Worldwide Travel Serv.,
Inc., 512 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Va. 1999) (citation omitted) ("An employee's duty of loyalty to
his employer includes the duty to follow the employer's reasonable instructions . . . even
though there may be differences of opinion as to the probability of success in carrying out
those instructions."). See also Guz, 8 P.3d 1089, at 1100 (describing "good cause" as "'a fair
and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith . . . as opposed to one that is 'trivial,
capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual. ) (internal citations
omitted).
72. See, e.g., Schlossberg & Malerba, supra note 4. A poll by the Employment Law
Alliance found that fifty-nine percent of employees believe employers should be allowed to
discipline or terminate workers who post confidential or proprietary information concerning
the employer. Joyce, supra note 5. Likewise, "badmouthing" an employer "can trigger a
series of events resulting in unintended, yet seriously damaging, consequences for the
organization." Robert J. Bies & Thomas M. Tripp, Badmouthing the Company, in
MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL DEVIANCE 97, 105 (Roland E. Kidwell, Jr. & Christopher L.
Martin eds., Sage Publ'ns 2005). See also Marisa Ann Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When
You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse
Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 677-80 (2004) (discussing potential
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Gates, Chairman of Microsoft Corporation, likened the situation as going
from just a few spokespeople to thousands of spokespeople, "[s]o you'll get
into issues." 3 The Automobile Club of Southern California fired twenty-
seven employees because of messages they posted online after another
employee had "complained to management about feeling harassed by the
comments. 74  The messages allegedly included comments on other
workers' weight and sexual orientation.75  Though the one worker's
complaint may have alerted the Automobile Club to the existence of the
messages, it was other online comments which directly led to the
dismissals: the employees discussed how they planned to slow down
roadside assistance at work, something "'[t]hat hits at our basic service,"'
according to an Automobile Club spokesperson.7 6 Such comments would
relate directly to insubordination, conduct which can supply a just cause for
discharge. Similarly, public comments by one employee regarding the
failings of management or co-workers could disrupt interpersonal
relationships that could hinder workplace productivity.
The Mini-Microsoft blog, discussed above,77 is one employee blog
that may test the limits of when an employee's anonymous comments
critical of management are merely no more than "water cooler" griping
versus just cause for dismissal. The anonymous Mini-Microsoft blogger
has posted comments that have referred to Microsoft as a "'passionless,
process-ridden, lumbering idiot.' 78  The blog, however, also reportedly
contains earnest suggestions for fixing Microsoft. 79 A major question in
this particular case is whether or not public criticism that may embarrass or
annoy a major corporation constitutes just cause for dismissal. To put it
another way, does the public embarrassment or annoyance constitute a
legitimate business concern? In a possibly analogous case, a Colorado
district court upheld the discharge of an employee whose letter that was
critical of management at his work place was published in a newspaper.8 0
The employer justified its decision to discharge the employee on the basis
that the employee had breached an implied duty of loyalty to the
employer.8 As such, griping about work, and particularly, criticizing
management may constitute just cause for discharge.
employer liabilities for employee conduct, such as off-duty comments by a supervisor that
may be discriminatory).
73. Gates: Good Riddance to Options, Bus. WK., May 16, 2005, at 10 (Up Front).
74. Auto Club Fires 27 in Message Board Crackdown, supra note 16.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Green, supra note 50.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1458, 1458 (D.CO 1997).
81. See infra notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
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D. Termination in Violation of the Terms of an Implied Contract
The issues are more complex when the dismissal is purportedly in
violation of an implied-in-fact contract. It must first be determined
whether an enforceable implied contract exists and, if so, what its exact
terms are. Whether the firing of an employee complies with or violates the
terms of an implied-in-fact contract depends on applicable state law as well
as the conduct of the parties.
"[E]mployer representations regarding the job security of employees
and/or the manner in which termination decisions are to be made ... [can
be] treated by courts as enforceable, contractual provisions, even though an
express contract is absent and employment would otherwise be at will."82
These implied contract terms can arise from "[w]ritten statements by
employers contained in employee handbooks and performance evaluations,
oral statements made by supervisors or interviewers attempting to attract
employees, and the history of a company's practices with respect to
retaining employees."83 The general rationale courts have used to enforce
implied contract terms is "the fundamental unfairness that inheres when
employers can derive benefits from extending promises of job security to
employees, only to disregard those pledges when it becomes convenient to
do so."84
In Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, the Colorado Supreme Court
reviewed the three basic theories followed by courts where an employee
manual sets forth termination procedures: (1) the procedures are not
contractually binding on the employer; (2) the procedures are a unilateral
offer of employment for which continued service by the employee may
constitute consideration and acceptance; and (3) the procedures may be
binding on the employer not on the theory of contract but on the basis of
the employee's reasonable and detrimental reliance on the terms of the
manual.85 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the first two alternatives,86
82. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 22, at 646-47.
83. Id. at 647. Of course, employees have to be aware of the contents of the handbooks
in order to rely upon their terms. See, e.g., Prysak v. R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629, 632
(Mich. App. 1992) (stating that while "[a]n employee's legitimate expectations may be
based on the employer's written policy statements set forth in an employee manual or
handbook[,]" the employee cannot rely on those expectations if he never saw the handbook,
nor was told of its contents.) (citation omitted).
84. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 22, at 667 (footnote omitted).
85. 731 P.2d 708, 710-11 (Colo. 1987).
86. Id. at 711.
We adopt neither the categorical rule that an employee manual automatically
becomes part of the employment contract and that an employee can be
terminated only in accordance with its terms, nor do we adopt the contrary rule
that such manuals are no more than unilateral expressions of general company
policies which have no bearing on the employee's contractual rights.
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adopting a middle ground requiring a showing that the handbook terms
were offered to the employee and the employee's initial or continued
employment constituted an acceptance and consideration of these
procedures.87
Only the state of New York expressly rejects implied contracts as
possibly limiting the employment-at-will doctrine, 88 although additional
states have adopted some very limited (if at all) implied contract exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine.8 9 In Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., the
California Supreme Court elaborated on a more expansive view of whether
the parties' conduct can alter the employee's status of employment at will:
"Where there is no express agreement, the issue is whether other evidence
of the parties' conduct has a 'tendency in reason' (Evid. Code, § 210) to
demonstrate the existence of an actual mutual understanding on particular
terms and conditions of employment.' 90
Id.
87. Id. In addition, the Colorado Supreme Court adopted the third alternative as a final
recourse for the employee to avoid injustice. Id. at 712.
88. Lobosco, 751 N.E.2d at 464, citing Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d
86, 87 (1983).
89. See, e.g., Peterson v. Beebe Med. Ctr., Inc., 623 A.2d 1142 (Del.Supr. 1993)
(Table) (unpublished decision) (finding that employee classified in personnel records as
"Full Time, Permanent," and who was terminated and whose termination did not follow
procedures specified in employee handbook, was not wrongfully discharged even though
handbook did not did not expressly reserve the right to terminate without cause). "Under
well settled Delaware law, an at-will employment relationship is subject to termination with
or without cause. This means that absent bad faith, an employer has the freedom to
terminate an at-will employment relationship for its own legitimate business, or even highly
subjective, reasons." Id. at *2 (citations omitted); McConnell v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 499
So.2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that the subject employment contract has no
definite term of duration and thus was terminable at the will of either party, despite
allegedly issued various letters, executive memoranda, and employee handbooks assuring
employees that they would not be terminated without just cause-as such unilateral policy
statements cannot, without more, give rise to enforceable contract rights); Orr v.
Westminster Village N., Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. 1997) (finding that an employee
handbook cannot constitute a valid unilateral contract in the absence of adequate
independent consideration); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So.2d 637, 638 (La. Ct.
App. 1982) ("Plaintiffs allegation that the defendant failed to comply with its own
personnel policy requiring three warnings to an employee prior to discharge does not
amount to an allegation that defendant was contractually obligated to her as part of an
employment contract to give her the warnings prior to discharge."); and Johnson v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. 1988) ("Given the general language
of the handbook and the employer's reservation of power to alter the handbook, a
reasonable at will employee could not interpret its distribution as an offer to modify his at
will status.") (citations omitted). See also Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 22 (discussing the
development of the implied contract limitation to the employment-at-will doctrine).
90. Guz, 8 P.3d, at 1101 (holding that the employer's written personnel documents set
forth implied contractual limits on the circumstances under which employees would be
terminated). See also, McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 820 P.2d 986, 988 (Wyo.
1991) (stating that statements in employee handbook that contents of handbook do not
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Employers can avoid possible express or implied contract restrictions
by conspicuously stating in all written statements relating to the
employment relationship, including employment contracts and employee
handbooks, that the employment relationship is "at-will." 9 '
As the number of employee blogs has grown, employers are
beginning, as well as being advised, to adopt "blog" policies.92 If an
employer has adopted a "blog policy," the employer may defend against a
possible wrongful discharge claim on the basis that the blogger has violated
that policy, and therefore has violated the terms of an implied employment
contract. As discussed previously, employees must at least establish "the
existence of an actual mutual understanding on particular terms and
conditions of employment[,]" 93 and so too must the employer. Vague
assurances or general guidelines will not suffice to establish enforceable
contract terms.94 In addition, merely notifying employees, particularly by
e-mail, of a new or modified policy most likely will not constitute
enforceable terms. 95  The courts are likely to conclude "there is a
constitute terms of a contract must be conspicuous to be effective).
91. See, e.g., Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'I Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995) (stating that employee handbook that expressly stated that it should not be treated as a
contract in any way, reserved the right to change any of the terms of the handbook at any
time, as well as the right to discharge any employee at any time, did not change the at-will
nature of the employment relationship), and Trabing v. Kinko's, Inc., 57 P.3d 1248, 1252-53
(Wyo. 2002) (stating that contents of handbook did not establish implied contract because
written employment agreement conspicuously stated that employment was at will).
92. See, e.g., Schlossberg & Malerba, supra note 4 ("[A) prudent way to avoid claims
of discrimination and accusations that an action was taken arbitrarily is to have a written
policy in place."); and William E. Hartsfield, 1 INVESTIG. EMPLOYEE CONDUCT § 6:11.50.
Blogs (Nov. 2005), which includes suggested blog policy statements. However, few
companies have adopted formal blog policies. See Joyce, supra note 5 (referencing a
Society for Human Resource Management survey indicating that 8% of companies "have a
written policy that provides employees with guidelines on what is acceptable to write about
in a personal blog").
93. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1101. See also McDonald, 820 P.2d at 988 (finding that disclaimers
in employment contracts must be conspicuous).
94. See, e.g., Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1458, 1466-67 (D. Colo.
1997) (holding that general statements in airline documents were insufficient to overcome
presumption of at-will employment); Guz, 8 P.3d at 1107 ("This brief and vague statement,
by a single Betchel official, that Betchel sought to avoid arbitrary firings is insufficient as a
matter of law to permit a finding that the company, by an unwritten practice or policy on
which employees reasonably relied, had contracted away its right to discharge Guz at
will."); and Orr, 689 N.E.2d at 720-21 (finding that employee handbook does not change
employment at-will).
95. See, e.g., Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir.
2005) (affirming lower court ruling that e-mail announcement regarding new dispute
resolution policy was insufficient to put employee on notice that the policy was a contract
that extinguished the right to access a judicial forum for resolution of federal employment
discrimination claims). "[T]he sufficiency of the notice turns on whether, under the totality
of the circumstances, the employer's communication would have provided a reasonably
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qualitative difference between . . . [a contractual] term and a policy that
informs the employment relationship but imposes no enforceable
obligations upon either party.,
96
E. Promissory Estoppel
Closely related to the implied contract exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine is the possible application of promissory estoppel, which
prevents "an employer from discharging an employee when the employer
made an assurance to hire for a specified period, or not to fire without
cause, and the employee reasonably relied on these assurances to his
detriment." 97 Promissory estoppel claims generally arise in relation to an
employee justifiably relying to his detriment on disciplinary or termination
procedures contained in an employee handbook. 98 Similar to an implied
contract claim, an employee discharged due to his or her blogging activities
would not have a claim directly associated with the blogging activities; the
employee's claim would be dependent upon detrimental reliance on
promises made by the employer in the workplace. However, if the
employer has adopted a blogging policy, then the employee who complied
with the policy but was nonetheless discharged may be able to assert that
his discharge occurred in spite of his (detrimental) reliance upon the policy.
prudent employee notice .... that continued employment would effect a waiver of the
right to pursue a claim in a judicial forum. Id. at 555 (citation omitted).
96. Id. at 556.
If a reasonable employee of General Dynamics would have known, given prior
dealings between the company and its work force, that personnel handbooks
operated as the functional equivalents of contracts, the introduction of a new
policy and the fact of its promulgation in a reissued handbook might have
sufficed to alert such an employee that the handbook contained legally binding
terms. Here, however, General Dynamics has produced no evidence that any
historical use of personnel handbooks in the workplace would have suggested
that the reissued handbook carried contractual significance. Therefore, we
conclude that the company's promulgation of a new handbook, without more,
does not support a finding of adequate notice.
Id. at 559.
97. Christopher L. Pennington, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At- Will
Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1583, 1592 (1994). See also,
Ballam, supra note 23, at 681 (noting that promissory estoppel can be used when an
employee relies on a promise not to discharge).
98. See, e.g., Trabing, 57 P.3d at 1255 ("In the employment context, promissory
estoppel works to prevent injustice to employees who in good faith detrimentally rely upon
an employer's actions, in turn binding the employer to fulfill a promise to an employee
despite the lack of an employment contract." (quoting Worley v. Wyo. Bottling Co., Inc., I
P.3d 615, 623 (Wyo. 2000))). See also, Orr, 689 N.E.2d at 712 (denying discharged
employees' promissory estoppel claims because there was no evidence they relied to their
detriment upon the handbook or any other statements by the employer).
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In such a circumstance, though, as exemplified by the position taken by the
Supreme Court of Colorado, the employee may still have a heavy burden to
establish a promissory estoppel claim:
[E]ven if the requisites for formation of a contract are not
found, the employee would be entitled to enforce the
termination procedures under a theory of promissory
estoppel if he can demonstrate that the employer should
reasonably have expected the employee to consider the
employee manual as a commitment from the employer to
follow the termination procedures, that the employee
reasonably relied on the termination procedures to his
detriment, and that injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the termination procedures. 99
F. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Underlying every transaction is an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 100 However, in regard to employer-employee relationships,
most states do not recognize this covenant, and of the few states that do
recognize it, these states do so in a limited fashion.'0 ' In particular, there
first must be an underlying contract. "[T]he implied covenant [of good faith
and fair dealing] does no more than protect the right to enjoy the benefits of
the contract. An at-will employee cannot use the implied covenant to
create a for cause employment contract where none exists.'1
0 2
The corollary to the covenant, and the manner in which courts have
applied the covenant in an employment relationship, occurs when the
employer acts in bad faith. A common example is when the employer
discharges an employee in order to avoid paying already-earned benefits.' 3
99. Continental Air Lines, 731 P.2d at 712 (internal citations omitted).
100. See Robert C. Bird & Darren Charters, Good Faith and Wrongful Termination in
Canada and the United States: A Comparative and Relational Inquiry, 41 AM. Bus. L.J.
205, 206 (2004).
101. See id. at 219. See also Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 22, at 653 (noting that,
regarding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, "systematic criteria differentiating the
approaches of states" have been difficult to identify).
102. Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 802, 827 (Cal. App. 2000)
(citations omitted). See also Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Colo., Inc., 931 P.2d 436
(Colo. 1997) (finding no cause of action in Colorado for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing for an at-will relationship, and also finding likewise, that there is
no independent tort of claims for alleged breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing).
103. See, e.g., Kelly v. City of Mesa, 873 F.Supp. 320, 329 (D. Ariz. 1994) ("Although.
[the covenant of good faith and fair dealing] does not create a duty for the employer to
terminate the employee only for good cause, it does protect an employee from discharge
based on an employer's desire to avoid the payment of benefits already earned by the
employee.") (citation omitted). Bad faith in the employment context is generally defined as
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An employee fired for blogging claiming an exception under the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing must demonstrate there was an underlying
agreement that was breached by the employer, or that the employer was
acting in bad faith, i.e., using the blogging activity as a pretext for trying to
avoid paying the employee already-earned benefits.
G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
outrageous behavior by the employer.1°4 It relates more to the conduct of
the employer related to the discharge, rather than the reasons for the
discharge itself.0 5 While many discharged employees raise this tort claim,
it is not commonly granted. Agis v. Howard Johnson, Inc. provides a good
example of the type of behavior required to establish a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 0 6 In Agis, the plaintiff's supervisor, as part
of an investigation into employee theft, stated that if he did not discover
who was responsible he would begin firing employees alphabetically.
Plaintiff Agis was the first employee fired.10 7 The Agis court concluded
that the fired employee had established the basis for a claim-that the
"defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, having a severe and
traumatic effect upon plaintiffs emotional tranquility."' 08  The conduct
must be, however, socially intolerable, not merely rude or boorish.0 9 An
employee fired for blogging, therefore, would not have a claim for
"depriving the employee of the benefit of her agreed upon employment bargain. This
'benefit of the bargain' requirement means that neither party will act in a way to deprive or
impair the other party from receiving the agreed upon benefits of the employment
relationship." Bird, supra note 27, at 544 (footnote omitted).
104. See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 90 (N.Y. 1983)
("'One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress'....") (citing
Fischer v. Maloney, 373 N.E.2d 1215 (N.Y. 1978))). "'Liability has been found only where
the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community."' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977)).
105. See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment
Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 671, 679 n.34 (1996) (explaining the basics of the tort claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
106. 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976).
107. Id. at 317.
108. 1d. at 319 (quoting Alcom v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498 (1970)).
109. See, e.g., Watte v. Maeyens, 828 P.2d 479, 481 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (denying
plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the employer called
employees liars and fired them without explanation); and Loya v. Wyo. Partners of Jackson
Hole, Inc., 35 P.3d 1246 (Wyo. 2001) (discharging an employee while.he is caring for his
mother on her deathbed did not constitute a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
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intentional infliction of emotional distress unless there was some additional
extreme, socially unacceptable conduct associated with the discharge.
H. Public Policy
The public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
prohibits employers from discharging at will employees who refuse to
violate the law on behalf of the employer;" ° comply with a law in some
way that displeases the employer;". or perform an act that promotes the
public good, particularly by revealing bad conduct by the employer (also
referred to as "whistleblower" cases). 12
Ballam notes that due to the fact that the early cases involving the
public policy exception involved terminations for exercising job-related
statutory rights, the "meaning of public policy was closely
circumscribed.""' 3 For example, in Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that a discharge that violates a clearly mandated
public policy would be exempt from the state's employment-at-will
doctrine, giving as examples discharging employees for filing workers'
compensation claims or for reporting crimes to the police-actions
mandated by respective state legislation." 4 Five states (Florida, Louisiana,
Maine, New York, and Rhode Island) have refused to adopt a public policy
exception."'
110. See, e.g., Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959)
(recognizing that the dismissal of an employee who refused to commit perjury for his
employer violated public policy). See also Ballam, supra note 23, at 656-59 (discussing
Petermann in more detail).
111. See, e.g., Lins v. Children's Discovery Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 976 P.2d 168 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999) (discharging a supervisor who refused to fire other employees who had filed
workers' compensation claims against the employer violated public policy).
112. See Pennington, supra note 97, at 1604-19 (discussing public policy exceptions
related to contesting employer activity contrary to public policy).
113. Ballam, supra note 23, at 661-62. See, e.g., Ali v. L.A. Focus Publ'n, 5 Cal. Rptr.
3d 791, 798 (Ct. App. 2003) ("To prevail on a claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy, the employee must identify a policy allegedly violated that is both substantial
and fundamental and rooted in constitutional or statutory law.") (internal quotations
omitted).
114. 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (Ill. 1985).
115. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Ct. App.
1978), affd, 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); Guillory v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, 802
F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); MacDonald v. E. Fine Paper,
Inc., 485 A.2d 228 (Me. 1984); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983);
Pacheo v. Raytheon Co., 623 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993) (each describing the lack of a public
policy exception in the respective jurisdiction). In addition, Arizona's public policy
exception has been superseded by statute. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501.3(c) (2006).
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I. Codification of the Public Policy Exception
Recently, the public policy exception has been codified by a number
of states through legislation that specifically protects employees from
discharge for consuming lawful products or engaging in lawful activities."'
The judicial interpretation of one state's statute may be illustrative of
whether such statutes could apply to employee blogs. Montana's "lawful
product" statute is similar to most other statutes in that it provides that an
employer "may not discriminate against an individual with respect to
compensation, promotion, or the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because the individual legally uses a lawful product off the
employer's premises during nonworking hours.""' 7 In McGillen v. Plum
Creek Timber Co., the plaintiff, who was employed by the defendant, was
fired after he decided to play a practical joke on his supervisor, who had
reported the plaintiff for sleeping on the job, by placing a classified ad in a
local paper for the sale of a truck, indicating that interested parties should
call the supervisor's home number late at night."8 The plaintiff argued that
his taking out the ad was a "use of a lawful product off the employer's
premises during nonworking hours."'1 9 In a jurisdiction with a similarly-
worded statute, an employee fired for the contents of a personal blog may
argue that she was fired based on the "use of a lawful product off the
employer's premises during nonworking hours." This argument would not,
however, be successful in Montana, or in any state that followed the
Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute. In McGillen, the
Montana Supreme Court noted that in defining "lawful product," the statute
"means a product that is legally consumed, and includes food, beverages,
and tobacco"'' 20 (i.e., something that can be literally consumed).'
2'
Six states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
York, and North Dakota), however, have passed broader laws protecting
employee off-site, off-duty conduct. Section 96(k) of the California Labor
116. The intent, and sometimes the express objective, of many of these statutes is to
prohibit the discharge of employees who use tobacco products. See Pagnattaro, supra note
72, at 641-46 (providing an analysis of the (so far) limited judicial applications of these
statutes). As discussed below (infra text accompanying notes 122-149), a few of these
statutes offer protection beyond the consumption of products, and include protection of
lawful conduct unrelated to employment. These statutes are often collectively referred to as
"lifestyle protection statutes." See Jason Bosch, None of Your Business (Interest): The
Argument for Protecting All Employee Behavior With No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L.
REv. 639, 654-58 (2003) (describing the nature and benefits of such statutes).
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(2) (2005).
118. 964 P.2d 18 (Mont. 1998).
119. Id. at 23 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (2005)).
120. Id. at 23-24.
121. See Pagnattaro, supra note 72, at 645-46 (describing the limits of certain lifestyle
statutes).
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Code authorizes the Labor Commissioner to take assignments of "[c]laims
for loss of wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or discharge from
employment for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away
from the employer's premises."'' 2 2 A plain reading of California's "lawful
conduct" statute indicates there is no limitation to the type of lawful
conduct protected. However, in interpreting section 96(k) in Barbee v.
Household Automotive Finance Corp., the California Court of Appeal ruled
that section 96(k) "does not set forth an independent public policy that
provides employees with any substantive rights, but rather, merely
establishes a procedure by which the Labor Commissioner may assert, on
behalf of employees, recognized constitutional rights."' 23 In other words,
section 96(k) appears to merely codify a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine, requiring a discharged employee to prove:
that he was terminated in violation of a policy that is "(1)
delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2)
'public' in the sense that it 'inures to the benefit of the public'
rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well
established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and
fundamental. ' '124
One public policy argument an employee who is fired due to blogging
may try to argue is that she was fired for exercising her First Amendment
free speech rights. This issue was raised in Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice
Corp. to determine whether section 96(k) protected an employee who was
fired, allegedly in violation of her state First Amendment rights, as a result
of her involvement with an investment program her employer considered to
be a pyramid scheme. 1 5 In Grinzi, the California Court of Appeal ruled
that an employee dismissed by a private employer cannot raise a public
policy issue under section 96(k) because California's First Amendment free
speech provision (like the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution)
protects only against governmental, not private intrusions. As a result, it
does not establish a public policy forbidding free-speech-based
terminations by private employers, and, as such, is not subject to section
96(k). 2 6 The majority of courts that have addressed whether there is a First
122. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003). As Pagnattaro points out, section 96(k) has
been extended to both employees and job applicants. Pagnattaro, supra note 72, at 647
(citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West 2003)).
123. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 412 (Ct. App. 2003) (reporting that the plaintiff argued that a
consensual relationship with a fellow employee that was conducted during nonworking
hours away from the workplace should be considered "lawful conduct" under section 96(k)).
124. Id. (quoting Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1165 (Cal. 1997)). See
also Pagnattaro, supra note 72, at 646-52 (discussing in detail applications and
interpretations of California's section 96(k)).
125. 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Ct. App. 2004).
126. Id. at 898-99.
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Amendment free speech public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine have ruled there is none, on essentially the same rationale as
Grinzi-the First Amendment protects against governmental actions, not
those of private employers.1
27
However, there may be some protection for a retaliatory discharge due
to an employee exercising free speech. In Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance
Co., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law,
concluded that protection of free speech rights was a significant enough
public policy concern to prohibit a private employer from discharging an
employee on the basis of the employee exercising his First Amendment
free speech rights. 2 s However, Novosel has been criticized, in particular,
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and generally not followed. 29 That
does not mean there is absolutely no free-speech protection against
discharge of an at-will employee of a private employer. Connecticut has
passed legislation which specifically provides a cause of action against a
private employer for discharges based on an employee's exercise of First
Amendment free speech rights. 3 0
127. See, e.g., Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (I11. 1985) ("It is well
established that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is only a guarantee against
abridgement by the government, Federal or State; the Constitution does not provide
protection or redress against private individuals or corporations which seek to abridge the
free expression of others.") (citations omitted); Prysak v. R.L. Polk Co., 483 N.W.2d 629,
634 (Mich. App. 1992) ("[A] private employer . . . is not bound by the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech.") (footnote omitted); Johnson v. Mayo Yams,
Inc., 484 S.E.2d 840, 843 (N.C. App. 1997) ("[P]laintiff's [refusal to remove a confederate
flag decal from his toolbox while] in private employment is not constitutionally protected
activity."); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc. 506 S.E.2d 578, 591 (W. Va. 1998)
("[T]he Free Speech Clause of the state constitution is not applicable to a private sector
employer ... [absent] a statute expressly imposing public policy emanating from the state
constitutional Free Speech Clause upon private sector employers."); Manson v. Little Rock
Newspapers, Inc., 200 F.3d 1172, 1173 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he defendant is a private entity,
not a governmental entity, and thus is legally incapable of violating anyone's First
Amendment rights."); Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 738 (Idaho 2003)
("The prevailing view ... is that state or federal constitutional free speech cannot, in the
absence of state action, be the basis of a public policy exception in wrongful discharge
claims [in the private sector].") (citation omitted).
128. 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3rd Cir. 1983) (discussing an employee discharged for refusing
to participate in his employer's lobbying effort and for his privately stated opposition to his
employer's political stand).
129. See, e.g., Shovelin Cent. N.M. Elec. Co-op, 850 P.2d 996, 1010 (N.M. 1993)
(declining to follow, in Novosell, the Third Circuit's broad interpretation of Pennsylvania
law regarding retaliatory discharge); and Tiernan, 506 S.E.2d at 588-89 (finding that courts
have retreated from Novsell's expansive interpretation of the Pennsylvania constitution as
applying constitutional policy to a private employer).
130. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 2003), which provides:
Any employer, including the state and any instrumentality or political
subdivision thereof, who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on
account of the exercise by such employee of rights guaranteed by the first
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However, the approach taken by the courts when applying
Connecticut's statute is that the speech in question, to be protected, must be
related to a matter of public concern, and cannot merely be related to
personal matters. For example, in Daley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., the
plaintiff, who was dismissed after writing an internal office memorandum
critical of management, claimed she was dismissed for exercising her free-
speech rights.' 3' The Connecticut Supreme Court first noted that
Connecticut's statute "applies to constitutionally protected speech, that is to
say, speech that addresses a matter of public concern."' 2 The court
therefore examined the motives of the plaintiff in drafting the
memorandum (which criticized the implementation of the defendant's
"family-friendly" workplace policy). According to the Connecticut
Supreme Court:
[I]f it is determined that an employee spoke "not as a citizen
upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon
matters only of personal interest," the statement is not protected,
and courts generally will not second guess the propriety of a
personnel decision made by an employer allegedly in reaction to
'33the employee's behavior ....
The court concluded that "[i]t is well settled that internal employment
policies are not a matter of public concern"'3 4 and upheld the trial court's
determination that the plaintiff had not met "the burden of establishing that
she was motivated to champion the rights of others, rather than to air her
own personal grievance with Aetna management."'' 35 Therefore, a blogger
amendment to the United States Constitution or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first
of the Constitution of the state, provided such activity does not substantially or
materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job performance or the
working relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable to
such employee for damages caused by such discipline or discharge, including
punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of any
such action for damages. If the court determines that such action for damages
was brought without substantial justification, the court may award costs and
reasonable attorney's fees to the employer.
131. 734 A.2d 112, 112 (Conn. 1999).
132. Id. at 120.
133. Id. at 122 (internal citations omitted).
134. Id. at 123 ("[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review
the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior." (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983))).
135. Id. at 124. Accord, Emerick v. Kuhn, 737 A.2d 456, 468 (Conn. App. 1999)
(denying free-speech protection to a discharged at-will employee because when he criticized
management at an employee forum, "he was not exercising a right enjoyed by the general
citizenry but was exercising a privilege granted him by his employer."); Lowe v. Amerigas,
Inc., 52 F.Supp.2d 349, 359 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding that "[pilaintiff's opinions on
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who is fired after griping about work on her blog cannot claim protection
under Connecticut's statute unless she can show that she was expressing a
matter of public concern, rather than just complaining about management
inadequacies or unfairness. While the Connecticut District Court has noted
that merely because the speech is made in private, rather than publicly,
free-speech protection is not denied, 136 the opposite is not necessarily true.
In other words, publicly discussing employment issues does not
automatically make the speech a matter of public concern, as exemplified
in the discussion below regarding application of Colorado's "lawful
activity" statutory protection.
Colorado has enacted legislation that also prohibits an employer from
terminating "the employment of any employee due to that employee's
engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during
nonworking hours . . . ,,13' However, Colorado's "lawful activity"
restriction does not apply if the activity "[r]elates to a bona fide
occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee ....,,
Assuming a fired blogging employee was engaged in a lawful activity, the
question arises whether that activity was related to her employment.
In a case substantially analogous to an employee blogging about work,
the U.S. District Court applied Colorado's "lawful activity" statute in
Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., a case in which an airline employee had
customer service, employee attitudes, racial remarks by other employees, inventory control
problems, and training clearly related to matters between plaintiff and AmeriGas and were
not matters of public concern" whereas "[p]laintiff's complaints about safety concerns
regarding the improper storage of a hazardous substance such as propane . . .implicate
matters of public concern and, thus, constitute protected speech."); MacKay v. Rayonier,
Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 22, 30 (D. Conn. 1999) ("[A]n employee's statements are not
constitutionally protected ...when they relate exclusively to matters concerning the
employee's personal interests, as opposed to matters of public concern."); Urashka v.
Griffin Hosp., 841 F.Supp. 468, 474 (D. Conn. 1994) (affording "protection to the plaintiff
only if the speech for which she was allegedly terminated involved a 'matter of public
concern."'). But see Campbell v. Windham Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 389 F.Supp.2d 370,
382 (D. Conn. 2005) (stating that discharged employee's speech was potentially protected
speech because it addressed her employer's potentially illegal practices with respect to
private third parties-specifically, "[w]hether a non-denominational not-for-profit hospital
is discriminating against patients or disclosing confidential information is a matter of public
concern."); Winik-Nystrup v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 8 F.Supp.2d 157, 157 (D. Conn. 1998)
(explaining plaintiffs statements to her superiors regarding her planned vacation with a
friend who worked for a competitor and her act of taking the vacation were not protected
speech, whereas her association with her friend may be protected by the First Amendment).
136. See Campbell, 389 F.Supp.2d at 382 (illustrating potentially protected speech based
on written responses to employer); Lowe, 52 F.Supp.2d at 355 (explaining that plaintiffs
potentially protected speech, complaints of allegedly improper storage of propane, was in
the form of internal complaints).
137. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2001).
138. Id. at § 24-34-402.5(l)(a).
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been discharged for writing a letter to a newspaper critical of the airline.'39
The court first determined that the purpose of the statute is to shield
"employees who are engaging in private off-the-job activity, that is
unrelated to the employee[']s job duties, from termination for participation
in the non-work related activities.,,140 However, noting that the shield is not
absolute and "that the legislature recognized that the policy of protecting an
employee's off-the-job privacy must be balanced against the business needs
of an employer . . ." the court concluded "that one of the bona fide
occupational requirements encompassed within the scope of
[Colorado's 'lawful activities' statute] is an implied duty of loyalty, with
regard to public communications, that employees owe to their
employers. 14' The court considered the actions of the plaintiff as that of"a
disgruntled worker venting his frustrations to his employer whom he felt
betrayed him and his coworkers."' 142  The court concluded there was no
wrongful discharge, "because Plaintiff was not attempting to inform the
public of a safety concern, and because Plaintiff did not attempt to solve his
grievance through Delta's grievance system, his actions breached the bona
fide occupational requirements of an implied duty of loyalty encompassed
in .... [Colorado's 'lawful activities' statute].' ' 43 Based on this reasoning,
if an employee is publicly griping about work in her personal blog, she is
subject to discharge, despite her being engaged in a private off-the-job
activity, because she has violated a duty of loyalty owed to her employer.
The state of New York has adopted legislation that prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their legal
political activities, legal use of consumable products, and legal recreational
activities-all off-site, outside of work hours without the use of the
employer's equipment or other property. 44  The statute specifically
excludes, however, any activity which "creates a material conflict of
interest related to the employer's trade secrets, proprietary information or
other proprietary or business interest. . . ,,14' To date, the majority of cases
dealing with the "recreational activities" portion of the statute have defined
recreational activities as not including romantic relationships or
extramarital affairs, 146 although the Supreme Court, Appellate Division has
139. 952 F.Supp. at 1462.
140. Id. at 1462-63.
141. Id. at 1463.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201(d)(2)(d) (McKinney 2005). The statute also prohibits
discrimination based on membership in a union. Id.
145. Id. at § 201(d)(3)(a).
146. See, e.g., State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(finding that legislative history of statute forbidding employer discrimination against
employees excluded dating relationships from the definition of leisure activities); McCavitt
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ruled that an employee who was terminated as a result of a discussion
during recreational activities (dinner at a restaurant) outside of the
workplace in which her political affiliations became an issue, stated a cause
of action for a violation of the state's statute. 4 Similar to Colorado's
statute (as well as North Dakota's, discussed below), New York's statute
excludes activities which conflict with the employer's business interest. It
is arguable, therefore, that if the New York statute were applied to
employee blogging activities, the courts may find publicly griping about
work to conflict with the employer's business interest.
North Dakota's statute prohibits discrimination by an employer, in
part, based on an employee's "participation in lawful activity off the
employer's premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct
conflict with the essential business-related interests of the employer. 1 48 In
the only case interpreting this language, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota ruled that it was a disputed issue of fact whether a chaplain who
was discovered engaging in unseemly behavior in a Sears store bathroom
was terminated for participating in lawful activity off the employer's
premises during nonworking hours.
1 49
Massachusetts has adopted legislation which specifically protects an
employee's right of privacy, a subject which is discussed below.
J. Invasion of Privacy
The origin of the notion of an individual right of privacy is traced to
an 1890 article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 5° Some states have
codified the right of privacy, or incorporated it in their constitution.
5
1
Although courts have been very reluctant to recognize employee privacy in
the workplace, 52 most workplace invasion of privacy actions are based on
the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion. 153  The Restatement
v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166 (2nd Cir. 2001)(finding same).
147. Cavanaugh v. Doherty, 675 N.Y.S.2d 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2005).
149. Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 820 (N.D. 1998).
150. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
151. See Todd Wesche, Reading Your Every Keystroke: Protecting Employee E-Mail
Privacy, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 101, 109 (2002) (discussing common law's adaptation to
developing technology and, consequently, increased opportunities for employers to invade
their employees' privacy).
152. See Joan Gabel & Nancy Mansfield, The Information Revolution and its Impact on
the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 A.B.L.J. 301,
313 n.58 (2003) (providing a list of cases denying claims of invasion of employee privacy
based on conduct such as a locker search, video surveillance, desk search, and monitoring
telephone calls).
153. See Wesche, supra note 151, at 110-11. See also Gabel & Mansfield, supra note
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(Second) of Torts defines the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as follows:
"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person."' 5 4 Courts have recognized that
employees may have a limited expectation of privacy in the workplace
(principally based upon intrusion of seclusion), and that if an employee is
terminated on the basis of information obtained through an invasion of
privacy, the employee's discharge may be wrongful.'55
Of course, as Pagnattaro points out, before an employee can make a
claim that their privacy was violated, the information that forms the basis
of claim must truly be private. 5 6 The tort of invasion of privacy would
therefore not apply to an employee's blog that is available for anyone with
Internet access to read. However, not all blogs are available to the public.
In addition, the majority of workplace privacy cases have involved on-the-
job activities, while a private blog maintained by an employee would be
categorized as off-the-job conduct. Few cases have dealt with workplace
privacy in the context of off-site activities, though they still have a close
nexus to the workplace. For example, in Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., an
employer hired undercover agents to investigate workplace vandalism and
allegations of employee drug use. 5 7  The reports from the undercover
investigators also included information related to various employees'
personal lives. 5 ' In Johnson, the Illinois Appellate Court formally
recognized the tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion and
adopted the four elements necessary to establish a claim for the tort: "(1)
an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs seclusion; (2) an
intrusion that is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the
matter upon which the intrusion occurs is private; and (4) the intrusion
152, at 313.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965). See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury
Co., 914 F.Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1996). There are three additional recognized categories
of invasion of privacy (which are not directly applicable to circumstances involving
employee blogs): appropriation of another's name or likeness (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652C); unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life (RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D); and publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E). For an analysis of all four
categories of invasion of privacy applied to off-the-job conduct, see Pagnattaro, supra note
72, at 630-40.
155. Id. at 630
156. Id.
157. 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
158. The personal information included "information regarding employees' family
problems, health problems, sex lives, future work plans, and attitudes about [the] defendant.
.. [K-Mart]." Id. at 1196.
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causes anguish and suffering."'
59
One issue applicable to a private employee blog is whether the fact
that the information is voluntarily disclosed negates a claim for intrusion
upon seclusion. In Johnson, the defendant (K-Mart) claimed there could be
no intrusion upon seclusion since the employees voluntarily disclosed the
personal information in question. The court believed, however, that the
means used by K-Mart to induce the plaintiffs to reveal the personal
information were deceptive, ruling there was a material issue of fact as to
whether K-Mart's "act of placing private detectives, posing as employees,
in the workplace to solicit highly personal information about defendant's
employees was deceptive.1 60 In overturning the lower court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of K-Mart, as to the personal information
collected, the court found "that a material issue of fact exists regarding
whether a reasonable person would have found defendant's actions to be an
offensive or objectionable intrusion.''
In Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., the U.S. District Court
dealt with a situation where the employer monitored a private phone call by
an employee, where the call took place through the Church's phone
system. 162 Here, there was an element of privacy because the employer had
given permission to employees to use the phone in an empty office for
private phone calls. In addressing claims by the plaintiff of the Church's
violation of specific provisions of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 163 the court denied the Church's motion for summary judgment to
dismiss that claim because once other Church employees determined that
Fischer's telephone conversation was not work-related, "they had an
obligation to cease listening and hang up."'6 It could be argued, therefore,
that if an employer is monitoring a private employee's blog, it has no
legitimate business interest in doing so .once it ascertains there is no work-
related content. Of course, if the employer does find work-related
information on the blog, then the employee's claim of intrusion upon
seclusion would be weakened.
Overall, courts have not been conducive to finding liability for what
are essentially off-site intrusions by employers. For example, in Smyth v.
Pillsbury Co., the court upheld the discharge of an employee who was fired
because of the content of an e-mail message he sent from his home to a
supervisor over the company's e-mail system. 65 The company determined
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1197. See also Pagnattaro, supra 72, at 633 for additional discussion of
Johnson.
162. 207 F.Supp.2d 914 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a),(c).
164. Fischer, 207 F.Supp.2d at 923.
165. 914 F.Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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the e-mail was inappropriate and unprofessional-this despite the fact the
company had stated that it would not monitor e-mail messages. 66 The
court ruled there was no "reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail
communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over
the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such
communications would not be intercepted by management."'
' 67
The facts in Karch v. Baybank FSB appear very closely analogous to
circumstances surrounding a private employee blog. 68 In Karch, neighbors
overheard a telephone conversation between Karch and her friend, a co-
worker, on their radio scanner. The conversation took place on a Saturday
evening, during non-work hours, and it involved mostly personal matters;
however, some work-related comments were overheard. Initially, the
neighbors listened to the conversations for amusement, but they later
reported them to the defendant. Karch was initially reprimanded and had a
note inserted into her personnel file admonishing her to "'limit her
conversations regarding personal situations with [bank] personnel as well
as customers."",169  Karch ultimately resigned, claiming her workplace
became hostile. 70 As to Karch's claim of invasion of seclusion against the
defendant and one of its officers, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
upheld the lower court's dismissal of the claim, ruling that it was the
neighbors who had potentially intruded upon Karch's seclusion, not the
Bank (and particularly the officer) who had received the information and
then acted upon it. 7' Karch indicates that if readers of a private blog report
its content to the blogger's employer, most likely there is no possible claim
for intrusion upon seclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the blogging phenomenon continues to grow, one could expect
more employees to be fired as a result of the content of their personal
blogs. Whether the employees have any recourse-i.e., whether the
employer faces liability for wrongful discharge-depends on a variety of
state and federal laws, both common and legislative. For example,
employers may be limited by federal law (the Secured Communications
Act) from accessing private employee blogs (where the employer has not
been authorized to access the blog). Employers may also face liability,
166. Id. at 98.
167. Id. at 101. See also Pagnattaro, supra note 72, at 634-35, for additional discussion
of Smyth.
168. 794 A.2d 763 (N.H. 2002).
169. Id. at 769.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 773. See also, Pagnattaro, supra note 72, at 635 for additional discussion of
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again under federal law (the National Labor Relations Act), if the content
of an employee's blog (whether public or private) rises to the level of
concerted activity (i.e., the blog is used by employees to improve their
working conditions, rather than merely occasionally complain about the
workplace). The employer must also ensure that all employees are treated
equally to avoid a claim by a protected class of employees that their
blogging activities were treated differently than similar activities by
employees outside the protected class.
Where there is an express employment agreement, an employer may
find just cause for terminating an employee who injures the employer's
reputation or interests by publicly criticizing the employer. Under this
theory, the employee has violated a duty to be loyal to his or her employer.
Whether the discharge is subject to an implied contract is more complex,
depending on both the jurisdiction and the actions of the parties. The
employer may need to ensure compliance with discipline and termination
procedures stated in employee handbooks. Similarly, if the employer has
adopted a blog policy, the employer must ensure that it has not casually
communicated it to employees (i.e., it must be clearly made part of the
employment agreement) and the employer must follow the policy if taking
action against the employee.
Despite these potential statutory or contractual liabilities, the
employment-at-will doctrine remains a powerful tool for employers to
discharge employees without having to establish a just cause. While some
commentators have argued that the evolution of exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine may be portending its demise, 7 2 this review
of the doctrine, particularly in an attempt to apply its exceptions to
employees fired for blogging, clearly indicates the doctrine is alive and
well. Even in states that have statutorily extended protection for at will
employees who are discharged for engaging in lawful conduct, the
protections are still quite limited. In particular, there is no overt protection
for employees when their conduct adversely affects the employer's
legitimate business interest. And though employees may believe they have
a free-speech right to say what they wish, the majority of courts recognize
that this right does not apply in a private employment relationship. And the
one state that does extend the free-speech right to private employees limits
its application to issues of public concern-not mere griping about work.
172. See, e.g., Ballam, supra note 23, at 654 (footnotes omitted):
The doctrine was widely followed throughout the late-nineteenth
century and the first part of the twentieth century. Dating from the
1960s, however, when government was focusing more of its regulations
on quality of life and individual liberty issues, many exceptions to the
doctrine's applicability began developing from both statutory and
common law sources.
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Finally, because fundamentally, most employee blogs are public, a
blogging employee will find little, if any, protection in a claim for invasion
of privacy. However, even where an employee maintains a private blog
(limiting access to pre-authorized users), courts have not been sympathetic
in analogous situations-generally requiring outrageous behavior on the
part of the employer, and only where the content is purely personal, with no
relationship to the employer.
Based on current employment law, employees who blog are best
advised to heed the caveat: bloggers beware.
